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1.  Introduction 
 
The negotiations of Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
between the EU and Canada (CETA) has caused some to fear that EU 
standards of genetic modified organisms (GMO) regulation in the agri-
food field will be watered down following the entry into force of the 
agreement.1 In Alessandra Arcuri’s article ‘Is CETA keeping up with the 
promise?’, provisions addressing biotechnology were interpreted in the 
light of the rules on treaty interpretation to conclude that those 
provisions should be read as being largely ‘respectful of stringent 
regulatory standards and of the precautionary principle.’2  
As a side note in the latter article, Arcuri points out that ‘the 
European regulatory framework [in the field of GMOs] is presented as 
monolithic in the context of CETA’, whereas ‘the reality is more 
complex.’3  This comment aims to draw attention to and expand on this 
side note by analysing the paradoxical situation that in the field of GMO 
regulation the EU speaks with ‘one voice’ in trade negotiations despite 
 
* PhD Candidate at Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
1 K Kodde, ‘CETA trade deal puts EU food and agriculture standards at risk’ (2017) 
<www.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/Blogs/makingwaves/ceta-trade-canada-eu 
-food-and-agriculture-leaks/blog/60271/>; B Thomsen, ‘CETA’s threat to agricultural 
markets and food quality’ in H Mertins-Kirkwood et al (eds), Making Sense of CETA (2nd 
edn, PowerShift 2016); C Then, ‘Freihandel – Einfallstor für die Agro-Gentechnik’ 
(2015) Study on behalf of the Green Party in the German Federal Parliament. 
2 A Arcuri, ‘Is CETA keeping up with the promise? Interpreting certain provisions 
relation to Biotechnology’ (2017) 41 QIL 58. 
3 ibid 38. 
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there being no consensus among Member States in this policy field. This 
lack of internal consensus has been a subject of major regulatory struggle 
in the EU for many years now and has caused the policy field of GMO 
regulation to become the ‘most gridlocked on the Union’s agenda despite 
continuous reform efforts.’4 The most recent reform strategy has been to 
give up on finding a common ground and on taking decisions on the 
desirability of GMOs as a community by rolling competences back to the 
Member States. In the field of GMO cultivation this has been done by 
providing Member States with the possibility to single-handedly restrict 
or prohibit the cultivation of GMOs in their territory. Despite the 
foregoing, the EU still speaks unisono in trade negotiations on this topic, 
as it did in the negotiations leading up to CETA. This is a paradox that 
has so far been discussed – at most – tangentially, even though a closer 
look reveals that it is seriously problematic. 
 
 
2.  Complex and everything but monolithic – The EU regulatory 
framework for GMOs 
 
The regulatory framework for the authorisation of the cultivation of 
GMOs under Directive 2001/18/EC5 and of GM food/feed under 
Regulation 1829/20036 requires a case-by-case evaluation of the risk of 
each GMO that is intended to be place on the market. The authorisation 
process constitutes a so-called ‘risk analysis’,7 which is divided into a ‘risk 
assessment’ and ‘risk management’ phase. In the risk assessment phase, 
the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) issues a scientific opinion 
 
4 M Weimer, ‘Risk Regulation and Deliberation in EU Administrative Governance – 
GMO Regulation and Its Reform’ (2015) 21 Eur L J 623. 
5 Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 
2001 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms 
and repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC – Commission Declaration [2001] OJ L 
106/1 (Deliberate Release) art 4(3). 
6 Regulation (EC) 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed [2003] OJ L 268/1 (GMO Food 
and Feed) art 4(2). 
7 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 
January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, 
establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters 
of food safety [2002] L 31/1 (General Food Law Regulation) art 6. 
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defining the risk of the GMO in question. In the risk management phase, 
the European Commission is tasked to consider the results of EFSA’s risk 
assessment as well as ‘other factors legitimate to the matter under 
consideration’8 in order to issue a draft decision that grants or refuses the 
authorisation of the GMO in question. Member States then take a vote 
on this decision in the comitology committee. On paper, the 
authorisation system was regarded ‘as a promising example of 
precautionary transnational governance’ as it attempts to ‘reconcile two 
potentially conflicting notions of legitimacy, namely the scientific and the 
political legitimacy of GMO authorizations.’9 It is, however, no secret 
that the EU authorisation system for GMOs turned out to be a failure 
and has been at a breaking point for many years now.  
The main shortcoming of the EU regulatory framework for GMOs is 
the failure of the authorisation process to take into account a wider range 
of more individualised factors that go beyond the scientific assessment 
and that member states consider relevant. . The time and place for this to 
be done is the risk management stage. However, while Member States are 
incapable of bringing non-scientific factors that they deem relevant into 
the comitology forum, the Commission is adamantly ignoring factors 
beyond science when issuing its draft decision. As pointed out by Arcuri, 
since the creation of the centralised authorisation system for GMOs, 
Member States have never achieved the necessary majority in the 
comitology forum to make a decision (for or against a particular GMO).10 
If no necessary majority is achieved, the European Commission alone is 
authorised to take the final decision on the matter, which renders 
Member States unable to bring more individualised factors and 
considerations beyond science into the authorisation process. The 
Commission, for its part, does not include factors beyond science in its 
draft decision. According to the Commission, ‘other legitimate factors’ 
can be taken into consideration in addition to EFSA’s risk assessment but 
 
8 ibid art 6(3). 
9 M Weimer, ‘Risk Regulation, GMOs, and the changes to the deliberation in EU 
governance, Politicisation and scientification as co-producing trends’ (2014) Amsterdam 
L School Legal Studies Research Paper No 2014-21 10. 
10 Arcuri (n 2) 38. 
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could not be used as a justification to deny EU authorisation if GMO has 
been deemed safe by EFSA.11  
The ignorance of factors beyond EFSA’s risk assessment necessitates 
the EU to fall back on the pretence that EFSA possesses ‘super-scientific 
powers’12 on which Member States should exclusively rely. Member 
States are not willing to do that, as becomes apparent in the post-
authorisation stage. Here, numerous Member States have illegally 
banned GMO cultivation in their territory based on, among others, 
ethical and socio-economic grounds that they felt were not taken into 
account in the centralized authorisation process. The Commission’s 
efforts to overturn Member States’ illegal bans of GM crops have been 
consistently rejected in the Council.13 
 
 
3.  Range of Member States views 
 
It is worth taking a look at just how different policy stances of Mem-
ber States are vis-à-vis GMOs. Member States have been classified on the 
basis of their (non-)acceptance of plant biotechnology into ‘adopters’, 
‘conflicted’, and ‘opposed’.14 ‘Adopters’ are Member States that grow 
GM plants (eg Spain, Portugal, Czech Republic and Slovakia) and Mem-
ber States that would be principally willing to cultivate GM plants under 
the right climatic and agricultural circumstances (eg Denmark, Flanders, 
the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom). Among the 
‘adopters’ particular note should be taken of the ‘GMO champion’ 
Spain. The latter is the only Member State that grows significant volumes 
of Bt maize, the sole GM plant authorised in EU. In fact, 30% of the total 
 
11 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amend-
ing Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 as regards the possibility for the Member States to 
restrict or prohibit the use of genetically modified food and feed on their territory, 
COM(2015) 177 final, 3-4. 
12 ibid 41. 
13 ‘Evaluation of the EU Legislative Framework in the Field of Cultivation of GMOs 
under Directive 2001/18/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and the Placing on the 
Market of GMOs as or in Products under Directive 2001/18/EC’ Final Report to DG 
SANCO (European Policy Evaluation Consortium 2011) 89. 
14 JM Lucht, ‘Public Acceptance of Plant Biotechnology and GM Crops’ (2015) 7 
Viruses 4265. 
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Spanish maize area is planted with Bt maize.15 ‘Conflicted’ Member 
States include countries where certain stakeholder groups would support 
the adoption of GM crops, but there is significant political pressure op-
posing GM technology, for example, from consumers and NGOs (eg 
France, Germany and Poland). In ‘opposed’ Member States, located 
mainly in Central and South Europe (eg Austria, Croatia, Greece, Hun-
gary and Italy), most stakeholders and politicians oppose the cultivation 
of GMOs.16 
It is by no means an exaggeration to claim that the issue of GMO 
regulation has divided regions, politics, societies and identities in 
Europe.17 A closer look at this ‘complex reality’ therefore inevitably 
brings up the question whose standards and whose policy stance the EU 
is actually representing when it speaks about agri-food biotechnology in 
trade negotiations. 
 
 
4.  The general trend of competences being rolled back to Member States 
 
The new Directive 2015/41218 amending Directive 2001/18/EC 
constitutes an attempt to find a way out of the gridlocked authorisation 
system. Article 26(b) of Directive 2015/412 provides Member States the 
option to restrict or prohibit the cultivation of GMOs that have been 
centrally authorised to be placed on the market. According to Article 
26(b), Member States may restrict or prohibit the cultivation of a specific 
GMO on the basis of ‘compelling grounds’, such as environmental policy 
objectives, socio-economic impacts or public policy. The diversity among 
Member States in this policy area is demonstrated again in the different 
reactions of Member States following the introduction of Article 26(b). 
For example, whereas Germany is opting for nationwide cultivation 
 
15 OECD, ‘Farm Management Practices to Foster Green Growth’ (2016) OECD 
Green Growth Studies 107. 
16 JM Lucht (n 14) 4265. 
17 M Weimer, ‘Risk Regulation and Deliberation’ (n 4) 624. 
18 Directive (EU) 2015/412 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
March 2015 amending Directive 2001/18/EC as regards the possibility for the Member 
States to restrict or prohibit the cultivation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in 
their territory [2015] OJ L 68/1. 
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bans, the UK indicated its intention to come up with regional strategies 
and to create a more diversified opt-out system.19 
One way to understand Directive 2015/412 is the European 
Commission compromising and giving up on the vision of a centralised 
authorisation system by legitimising the formerly illegal prohibitions and 
restrictions that have been applied by Member States to EU-wide 
authorised GMO seeds. However, it is important to note that Directive 
2015/412 also entails a shift of legal and political accountability from the 
EU to Member States, who do not only have the right to prohibit the 
cultivation of GMOs but will also have to ensure that measures taken 
comply with ‘international obligations of the EU, and in particular with 
the ones established under the World Trade Organisation (WTO).’20 
Illegal bans restricting GM food and feed have not been as widely 
used by Member States as in the field of GMO cultivation.21 
Nevertheless, following a review of the decision-making process on 
GMOs, the Commission also deemed the authorisation system set out in 
Regulation 1829/2003 on genetically modified food and feed as 
dysfunctional. This finding is based on the high number of Member 
States voting against the authorisation of GM food and feed and on the 
fact that Member States have never achieved the necessary majority in 
the comitology procedure. According to the Commission, it is apparent 
that Member States do not feel that the process allows them to fully 
address their individual concerns and fails to take into account factors 
which do not only relate to issues associated with the safety of GMOs for 
health or the environment.22  
 
 
19 M Geelhoed, ‘Divided in Diversity: Reforming The EU’s GMO Regime’ (2016) 18 
Cambridge YB Eur L Studies 21. 
20 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amend-
ing Directive 2001/18/EC as regards the possibility for the Member States to restrict or 
prohibit the cultivation of GMOs in their territory, COM(2010) 375 final, 7. 
21 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 
‘Reviewing the decision-making process on genetically modified organisms (GMOs)’ 
COM(2015) 176 final, 5. One Member State has measures relating to three products in 
place. 
22 ibid 6. 
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The Commission therefore proposed an amendment to Regulation 
1829/2003 that mirrors Article 26(b) in Directive 2015/412.23 The 
proposal suggests the inclusion of Article 34(a), which permits Member 
States to adopt measures restricting or prohibiting the use of GM food 
and feed. According to Article 34(a), such measures must be based on 
compelling grounds and cannot conflict with the risk assessment that was 
carried out. Measures adopted under Article 34(a) must also be reasoned, 
proportional and non-discriminatory and have to comply with EU law. 
This proposal was rejected by the European Parliament, among other 
things, based on concerns that the Commission proposal may be 
incompatible with internal market as well as WTO rules. The European 
Parliament therefore asked the Commission to withdraw its proposal and 
to submit a new one.24 
Despite the rejection of this proposal by the European Parliament, 
the point remains that, as a result of a review it undertook of the current 
legislation on the authorisation of GMOs, the Commission regards 
reform of the current system as absolutely necessary. Instead of reforming 
the centralized authorisation procedure, the Commission opts for the 
rolling back of competences to Member States and thereby confirms the 
reform strategy adopted for the cultivation of GMOs as the general 
reform strategy in the field of GMO regulation. The latter shows that the 
Commission understands the GMO policies of Member States are too 
diverse to maintain a centralised authorisation process and the main 
reason for the dysfunctionality of the authorisation process is that factors 
and more individual considerations that go beyond the scientific 
assessment are practically ignored.  
 
 
 
 
 
23 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 as regards the possibility for the Member States 
to restrict or prohibit the use of genetically modified food and feed on their territory, 
COM(2015) 177 final. 
24 European Parliament, ‘Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 as regards the 
possibility for the Member States to restrict or prohibit the use of genetically modified 
food and feed on their territory’ (2015) A8-0305/2015, 6. 
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5.  The consequences of the ‘false pretense of unity’ 
 
Based on the foregoing explanations, it is clear that there is no 
uniform policy stance among Member States in the field of GMO 
regulation. The centralised authorisation system failed as it was incapable 
of dealing with this diversity, which caused the Commission to start 
handing competences back to Member States. Nevertheless, the EU still 
speaks with ‘one voice’ in trade negotiations on the topic of 
biotechnology. The consequence of this false pretense of unity is that, as 
can be seen in CETA, the text agreed upon in the negotiations does not 
reflect the policy situation in the EU. Provisions on biotechnology in 
CETA do neither acknowledge that in the area of cultivation 
competences have been partly passed back to Member State level, nor 
does it reflect the recent policy change of Member States being able to 
restrict the use of GMOs on the basis of factors beyond science.  
To provide an example, in Article 25 CETA, the importance of 
‘shared objectives’ is noted, one of which is ‘to promote efficient science-
based approval processes for biotechnology product’ (Article 25.2 (2) 
(b)). Arcuri pointed out that there is room for interpretation of the term 
‘science-based’ as a nuanced vision of science compatible with the 
precautionary principle.25 What is still problematic, however, is that it 
does not reflect at all the recent policy change, codified in Directive 
2015/412, to restrict or even prohibit GMOs on the basis of factors that 
go beyond science. As elaborated above, this policy change is based on 
the acknowledgment of the European Commission that the authorisation 
system is flawed since considerations beyond EFSA’s scientific 
assessment are not taken into account within the authorisation process. 
Despite this, the Commission has apparently not insisted on including 
factors in the text of CETA that are relevant to Member States in the 
approval of biotechnologies, besides scientific factors. 
What are the repercussions of the above-discussed inconsistencies for 
Member States? Pursuant to Directive 2015/412, Member States can 
now restrict or prohibit the cultivation of GMOs on the basis of factors 
other than scientific considerations. The same may be possible for GM 
food and feed in the future. However, according to several commentators 
such restrictions and prohibitions possibly constitute a violation of WTO 
 
25 Arcuri (n 2) 52. 
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law or may be inconsistent with provisions of trade agreements between 
the EU and third countries,26 such as CETA. Whereas it seems reasonable 
that Member States have to take legal responsibility for their own 
individual restrictive or prohibitive measures, the discrepancies between 
internal and external GMO policy is likely to prove problematic. This is 
because Member States are granted – under EU law – the means to 
impose restrictions or prohibitions that may be deemed illegal on the 
basis of international trade rules, which the EU negotiated on behalf of 
all Member States. The fact that Member States have not been raising 
this issue can only be due to the vast number of concerns about CETA’s 
legal effects, of which some more intricate and complex ones are bound 
to get lost in the shuffle. However, it has to be expected that the 
consequences of the above-elaborated ‘false pretense of unity’ will 
become apparent sooner or later. 
 
  
 
26 Geelhoed (n 19) 33-34; H-G Dederer, ‘The Challenge of Regulating Genetically 
Modified Organisms in the European Union: Trends and Issues’ in Yumiko Nakanishi 
(ed), Contemporary Issues in Environmental Law, The EU and Japan (Springer 2016) 164. 
